

Turkey in Global Governance: An Evaluation of Turkey's G20 Presidency and the Antalya Summit 2015

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This article assesses Turkey's G20 Presidency. In addition to reviewing the outputs of Turkey's Presidency, it illustrates the importance and relevance of these outputs for the G20, as a whole. The article also provides an evaluation of certain dynamics and shortcomings which conditioned aspects of Turkey's performance during its hosting of the G20 Presidency. This article also aims to give a brief illustration of both global governance and the G20, and Turkey's position at their intersection, considering that contextualization of Turkey in global governance is a subfield demanding further study. Finally, the analysis reveals important findings and inferences with respect to unestablished middle powers and their contribution to global governance

Key words: Global governance, G20, Turkey, Antalya Summit, middle powers.

Turkey hosts the G20

In general, states regard hosting summits—political, cultural, economic, and other major international gatherings—as a great opportunity. These occasions indicate to the global public that the hosting state is economically sound and politically effective. Although great powers have utilized such opportunities to advance national prerogatives and further consolidate their leadership on global and regional scales, newly emerging powers, also, now seek these opportunities. For large emerging, and even middle powers, summit hosting is an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to make a novel contribution to global governance. Thus, major international gatherings can serve these emerging and middle powers as invaluable opportunities to prove their significance in the realm of global governance. The G20 Summit is one such international gathering, as it provides host governments remarkable autonomy in setting the priorities and the direction of the G20.

Since the launch of the Leaders' G20 Summit in 2008, hosting the G20 Presidency has turned into a mark of prestige. The Leaders' Summit, at which the major economies discuss various global matters, particularly economic issues, attracts remarkable attention from global media. To date, four countries—South Korea (Korea), Mexico, Australia, and Turkey—which are neither members of the G7 nor the BRICs, have hosted this privileged international gathering. Turkey hosted the Leader's Summit in Antalya on

November 15–16, 2015, following the G20 Presidency of Australia. Turkey obtained hosting from Australia on December 1, 2014.

This article seeks to assess Turkey's G20 Presidency. To this end, in addition to reviewing the outcomes of Turkey's Presidency, the article also illustrates the importance and relevance of these outputs for the G20. Furthermore, the article provides an evaluation of certain dynamics and shortcomings which conditioned aspects of Turkey's performance during its G20 Presidency.

Our analysis suggests that there are important findings and inferences to take from Turkey's hosting. First, for middle or emerging powers like Turkey with weak institutional attachments to global governance, G20 hosting carries inevitable value. The forum presents them with a privileged position, which Turkey would be unlikely to enjoy within the context of other institutional organizations or arrangements. Then, concerning Turkey's 2015 Presidency, even though its contribution to the G20 was less novel, and even limited in certain aspects, there were concrete developments in processing certain agenda items. There also seemed to be advances in the institutionalization of the G20 and the promotion of global economic growth. Notably, Turkey's furthering of the growth strategies adopted at the preceding Brisbane Summit is a prominent feature of Turkey's Presidency. Turkey's attention to the growth agenda could be seen as a good example both of ensuring continuity between summits and improving the coherence and legacy of interconnectedness within the G20. Finally, success in leading international gatherings, like the G20, depends on the nation's international clout and domestic stability. Where indicators in these spheres worsen, a nation's prospect for success in holding such gatherings declines, thus constraining its ability to make novel global contributions. Turkey's case is a good illustration for this. As opposed to when it volunteered to host the 2015 G20 Presidency in 2011, Turkey assumed the role in 2015 amidst significant domestic tensions and a relatively declining international clout. In this way, Turkey's domestic politics impacted negatively in its contribution to the G20.

Global governance today and the G20

The concept of global governance, simply, denotes "the way in which global affairs are managed". However, notwithstanding this concise definition, the concept of global governance is far more complex given that world politics lack "authoritative governmental institutions" (Keohane 1983, 148). Governance without government limits the hierarchical ordering in the global politics. Nonetheless, while lacking a hierarchical ordering principle, world politics is not just characterized by anarchy. Using the classic framing of Waltz (1979), the current manifestation of world politics is something in-between an anarchic order and a hierarchical order.

The state of world politics is also not static. As the scope and intensity of transnational relations involving many different actors, state, and non-state alike, increase, a greater need to govern these actors emerges. In other words, the need for greater governance has been seemingly growing to deal with the increasing complex interdependent world. This situation does not render world political global governance more hierarchical, but makes it certainly less anarchical. Even though the concept of global governance is

an imprecise term in this sense, it is perhaps functional in illustrating this dynamism in world politics, as increasing governance itself connotes a shift away from anarchy.

A relevant question remains, however: "Which dynamic does global governance rest upon?" This question directly relates to the G20. In a world of governance without government, the network of global governance takes its strength from multiple sources, including this informal G20. These sources could be thematically grouped as various governments, organizations, businesses, institutions, NGOs, and even international social movements, all of which are thought to contribute to the organization and management of global affairs. The agreements, platforms, charts, laws, and regulations, as well as customs, ethical standards, and norms which are generated by these bodies constitute the underlying dynamics of global governance. Global governance in turn determines how global affairs and transnational relations are managed. In an age of globalization, this context of governance has been increasing its depth and scope, even though not without problems. The problems are legion: global economic crises, poverty, climate change, epidemics, and transnational terrorism, just to name a few. When discussing the G20, we should keep in mind that it is both surrounded by, and a contributor to, this comprehensive context. Understanding this is necessary for examining the context of the G20 within the global order.

The crucial issue for global governance lies in whether it is equipped with necessary platforms, institutional arrangements, or governmental bodies that allow it to deal with the global challenges. In this context, the comparative advantages these bodies are endowed with are important. Before stating that the G20 constitutes a crucial body for global governance, it would be judicious to inquire whether the G20 has such a comparative advantage for global governance (Cooper and Thakur 2013).

It is reasonable to suggest that a prominent feature of the G20 is its role in providing a platform supporting informal and serious discussions where members can address and debate global affairs. Since its inception in 1999 as a forum for finance ministers and central banks, the G20 has grown into an iconic platform serving a globalized world that needs to deal with common challenges in a global context (Alexandroff and Brean 2015). In this respect, its *raison d'être* is directly embedded in global governance. On the other hand, the main feature of this informal platform is that it enjoys grand-scale agenda-setting and processing a more inclusive and representative basis. This constitutes its fundamental comparative advantage and contribution in terms of global governance.

Emerging and middle powers in global governance

Global governance is no longer the exclusive realm of the great powers, as the importance of emerging countries and middle powers within this network continues to see considerable increase. This means more participation from these countries. This stems in part from necessity: developing solutions for the common problems of a globalized world necessitates greater collective action that now includes participation from emerging countries and middle powers. This is as true in reaping the win-win benefits of a globalized world (i.e., economic prosperity from international trade) as it is in facing common challenges (i.e., climate change and global finance). The global financial crisis of 2008 best illustrates this principle. When the crisis broke,

there was dire need for crisis management in an interdependent world economy and the associated cooperative action from more than just the great powers.

Participation in global governance is also key to ensuring domestic prosperity (Inan and Asik 2014, 20). Thus, driven by multiple dynamics, global governance exists as a sphere in which emerging countries and middle powers believe they must somehow carve out their own space. In this context, in addition to the conventional powers in the G7, alternative subgroupings such as BRICs and MIKTA, which directly relate to the emerging and middle powers, are all quite functional and illuminative in demonstrating how the claims on global governance are currently underpinned by various dynamics and multiple facets (Cooper 2015).

Turkey's global governance role as a middle power

Turkey is a middle power country that has assumed growing importance, at least until recently. The discourse of "strategic importance", which has been in continuous circulation in discussions concerning Turkey, makes a multifaceted policy approach necessary for Turkish foreign policy. It can be said that a country like Turkey, which is located at the intersection of three continents (Asia, Europe, and Africa) and five sea basins (the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf), simultaneously encounters both political-economic opportunities and security risks (Davutoglu 2001). In this respect, Turkey's relevance in global governance could be argued in two ways: in terms of the assets Turkey brings and in terms of the challenges Turkey faces.

Turkey's relevance for global governance has evolved, particularly in the post-1990 era when the bipolar order ended. With the end of the Cold War, the fundamental dynamics upon which the foreign policy of Turkey was based underwent profound change. Turkish foreign policy, which had been focused on the United States and Western Europe during the Cold War, found new areas of engagement in the 1990s, especially in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Turkey was presented with a historic opportunity to politically and economically open itself toward culturally related communities in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011).

Beginning in early 2000s, Turkey engaged increasingly with the Middle East, a region it had mostly ignored with its establishment as a secular republic in 1923. In the same vein, Turkey pursued further engagement with the European Union (EU) in the early 2000s. Turkey's vision of EU membership added another dimension to the country's foreign policy. Participation in the EU process, particularly the implementation of the reforms demanded of Turkey by the EU, had the effect of making Turkish institutions more open, transparent, and efficient (Aydin-Duzgit and Tocchi 2015). Going beyond the traditional spheres of its foreign policy, during the 2000s Turkey also established friendly relations with Russia, the Soviet Union's successor. In the same period, Turkey's economic relations with Japan, China, and Korea experienced rapid development.

In this respect, the fact that Turkey's history, culture, and values have common roots with many other regions offers Ankara opportunities to

extend influence beyond its sphere of power in the international arena. Epithets like “civilizational bridge”, “energy hub”, and “regional peace broker” had demonstrated the country’s versatile assets in global governance.

On the other hand, the same geopolitical centrality that Turkey enjoys also poses a number of security challenges as well as political and economic risks. For Turkey, the immediate neighborhood includes three highly unstable regions – the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This makes encounters with security issues in which Ankara is not directly involved inevitable. Although this might seem like a mark *against* its potential contribution, this aspect constitutes another dimension of Turkey’s relevance for global governance. Its geographical position necessitates Turkey’s participation in the global problem-solving equations which must be developed to counter the challenges stemming from Turkey’s neighborhood. The implications of these challenges are globally far-reaching, at least at the normative level, even though the origins are often locally or regionally driven. Turkey’s support for the UN Security Council (UNSC) in backing the First Gulf War in 1991 and the country’s effective participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are examples. Recently, this principle has been further exemplified by Turkey’s recognized importance in the international coalition against the terror organization, ISIS, and the international refugee crisis stemming from the civil conflict in Syria.

As mentioned above, Turkey’s geographical location has led to hot conflicts and unstable development over the past 25 years and has had a direct impact on Turkey. As a developing country with a population of 80 million, Turkey has certain obligations to ensure its own economic prosperity and domestic stability. To combat regional instability and ensure economic prosperity, Turkey needs strong international partnerships and it needs to cooperate with international organizations and global forums such as the G20. In this respect, it is necessary for Turkey to engage in global governance, while its mechanisms for dealing with challenges of its immediate neighborhood well exceeds its capacity.

It would, however, be unwise to hold that Turkey’s relevance for global governance is only a potential. It will be seen that, beginning in early 1990s, Turkey attached importance to realizing its global governance potential: hosting significant international summits and events; increasing its engagement with international institutions; taking on mediation/diplomatic facilitation roles; and strengthening its niche diplomacy. This focus on global governance has especially been the case with a foreign policy activism evident from early the 2000s on.

In terms of hosting significant international summits and events, Turkey has a long record dating back to the 1990s. A selection of significant events it has hosted include: the 1996 UN Habitat II Istanbul Summit, the 1999 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in Istanbul, the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit, and the first-ever UN World Humanitarian Summit held in 2016 in Istanbul.

Beyond hosting these multilateral meetings, Turkey also increased its activities in mediation and facilitation efforts. This could be regarded as Turkey’s regional contribution to global governance (Onis and Kutlay 2017). As an example, Turkey sought to mediate between Israel and Syria leading indirect talks in 2008 (Walker 2008). This was followed in 2010 by Turkey’s efforts to address the Iranian nuclear crisis in cooperation with Brazil

(Hafezi 2010). In the same year, Turkey celebrated a diplomatic success in mending fences between Serbians and Bosnians, and bringing the two arch-rivals in the Balkans to the table at the “Trilateral Balkan Summit” (Yinanc 2010). In the following year, the so-called Istanbul Process was launched with the goal of “the reconstruction of Afghanistan with all neighboring countries” (Turkish MFA 2011).

In terms of participation in global governance mechanisms, Turkey’s international standing is also underpinned by its membership in many formal international organizations. Turkey’s membership includes: the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), NATO, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and Turkic Council. Propelled by similar dynamics of activism in its foreign policy, Turkey also added non-permanent UNSC membership for 2009–2010 to the list (Parlar Dal and Oguz Kok 2014, 5–8). In 2013, this was followed by Turkey’s participation as a dialogue partner in the China and Russia-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Kucera 2013), which could be understood as a growing interest in alternative international institutions not necessarily along the lines of its conventional orientation toward western institutions. In the same vein, Turkey participated as a founding member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank (AIIB).

Finally, it should be noted also that Turkey has participated in “niche diplomacy” (Cooper 1997) as an important issue area particularly at the normative level of global governance. In this regard, over the past decade, Turkey made significant investments in humanitarian diplomacy (Onis and Kutlay 2017, 13). Accordingly, a number of state-endorsed institutions like TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkish Airlines, TOKI (Housing Development Administration of Turkey), AFAD (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency), and Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) have assumed prominence in Turkey’s foreign policy repertoire together with a large number of humanitarian NGOs (Hasimi 2014). This heavy investment in humanitarian diplomacy is displayed by Turkey’s rise from 19th to 3rd place among donor governments delivering international humanitarian aid (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, 27). According to Bayer and Keyman (2012), niche diplomacy helped Turkey to project itself as “an emerging hub of globalization and internationalist humanitarian actor.”

Thus, it is clear that Turkey’s participation in global governance has a number of motivations. This intense foreign policy activism and arduous diplomatic efforts seem likely to yield “fruit” in the short and middle term. This certainly has been the case for Turkey. Nonetheless, despite the country’s active engagement in global governance through individual efforts, as a middle power, Turkey’s relation to global governance rests upon weak foundations, particularly in institutional terms. Given the institutional constraints of emerging powers like Turkey, the importance of the G20 for all these countries is clear. The G20 constitutes a platform in which an unestablished middle power such as Turkey can enjoy a rare privileged position.

Since 2013, Turkey has tried to foster a unique global vision by keeping a close watch on the experiences of other emerging countries and middle powers including most recently through its participation in MIKTA—Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia. Yet the country’s

G20 membership still stands as its most prominent institutional arrangement in terms of global governance. Thanks to its G20 membership, Turkey, it would seem, has gained a better grasp of the global agenda and its underlying trends. The G20 provides Turkey with a unique opportunity to develop its role in global governance.

Holding a G20 leaders' summit was an important milestone for Turkey. It was an opportunity, seemingly, for Turkey to demonstrate its capability to contribute to global governance. When Turkey volunteered to host the 2015 Presidency at the 2011 G20 Cannes Summit, Turkey was certain that this would increase its rising international clout and growing importance in global governance. In 2011, the country's assumption of the Presidency was also seen as a prime example of what then seemed to be an inexorable global shift in power away from great powers (Finkel 2015). The acceptance of Turkey's bid then not only revealed the country's rising international standing, but it also seemed to point to a changing global power configuration in the favor of emerging powers.

Review of Turkey's presidency: agenda items and outcomes

Measuring the success of a presidency is challenging. This is evident when we consider that there is continuity between presidencies with many similar agenda items being processed throughout successive terms, without necessarily being limited to a specific year. However, it is still possible to assess the relative success of a presidency through examining certain operational benchmarks:

- i. performance in agenda-setting and processing;
- ii. contributing to the institutionalization of the G20; and
- iii. generating concrete progress in terms of the G20's main task of economic cooperation and financial stability.

The following reviews the success of Turkey's Presidency against these benchmarks.

Agenda-setting and processing

Turkey's initial aim in its Presidency was to ensure "inclusive and robust growth through collective action." To this end, it formulated a G20 motto based on three Is: "Inclusiveness, Implementation, and Investment for Growth" (G20 Turkey 2015a, 3). Under this banner, Turkey determined its priorities around three pillars:

- i. Strengthening the global recovery and lifting the potential;
- ii. Enhancing resilience; and
- iii. Buttressing sustainability (G20 Turkey 2015, 5).

The first pillar encompassed issues like macroeconomic coordination, investment, employment, and trade while the second pillar included issues such as financial regulation, international financial architecture, international tax, and anti-corruption. The third pillar covered issues relating to development, energy sustainability, and climate change finance. Together these pillars constituted the official policy framework of the Turkish

Presidency, and it was along these lines that Turkey initiated and shaped its Presidency preparations and meetings over the course of 1 year.

During the 12 months of hosting, Turkey undertook significant efforts to make its Presidency fruitful and productive. During its G20 Presidency, Turkey held more than 170 meetings, which exceeds the number of meetings held by any preceding host (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1). They also held nine meetings at the ministerial level. Among these, the G20 Energy Ministers meeting was a first for the G20. The G20 Ministers of Agriculture meeting was held for the first time since 2011 (Canakci 2015, 5).

The ultimate purpose of much of this work was to prepare the ground for the leaders' summit, as its declaration document summarizes and binds the progress of a presidency. Among the many issues integrated into the Leaders' Declaration, two items stand out—the internet and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These issues were included in the Leader's Declaration for the first time as a G20 communique (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1). In the realm of macroeconomic coordination and financial stability, progress was also achieved. The most significant outcome in this sphere, sovereign debt restructuring, was introduced into the G20 leaders' Declaration where there was a need for recognition of sovereign debt crisis (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1). This is important as this outcome could pave the way for further work on this issue in subsequent summits (i.e., developing mechanisms such as “a global public mechanism to bring predictability to sovereign debt restructuring processes”) (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1).

Along with processing certain agenda items, another crucial function of G20 summits is that the leaders make certain mid- and long-term commitments within defined spheres, and these commitments later serve as goals to be advanced by member countries. It is expected that the G20 “must develop concrete, and achievable targets and measurable outcomes to address economic and development challenges at the global level.” (Inan and Asik 2014, 20). For instance, at the Brisbane G20 Summit, the leaders committed to reduce the gap between the share of men and women in the workforce by 25 percent by 2025 (Gurría 2015). This was also the case for the Antalya Summit. First, following the Brisbane Summit, leaders reviewed their progress toward the goal of reducing the gender gap in labor market participation (Whitehouse 2015). Likewise, in Antalya, member countries created a similar commitment related to employment and income distribution. In Antalya, the leaders agreed upon the target of reducing “the share of young people who are most at risk of being permanently left behind in the labor market by 15 percent by 2025 in G20 countries” (G20 Turkey 2015b). This is one of the new goals in the G20 long-term agenda toward which member countries will now work and, hopefully, at later summits review their progress.

Along with core issues concerning the well-being of the global economy, one of the main characteristics of the G20 leaders' summits is that they function as an arena for discussion and creation of problem-solving strategies for non-core issues, which are generally high-priority global challenges that must be dealt with in the year of the then current presidency. At the Australia 2014 Summit, the non-core issue was the Ukrainian Crisis and the Crimean Issue (Kalin 2015). In 2015, Turkey's Antalya Summit focused on “the Syrian conflict and the accompanying refugee crisis”. This issue was addressed in a separate session during the Summit (Kalin 2015). The Paris attacks added an *ad hoc* issue to the Antalya Summit and, in the name of

supporting counterterrorism efforts, the leaders condemned the terrorist attacks witnessed in Paris and Ankara, as well as Beirut and other locales around the world.

Institutionalization of the G20

Apart from exerting intense effort to keep certain issues on the agenda and process them, Turkey's G20 Presidency also led to concrete contributions in institutionalizing the G20. Even though these were not "ground-breaking" initiatives (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1), they represented measurable progress. For instance, in the context of enhancing the G20's organizational capacity, the Turkish Presidency launched the Women 20 (W20) (Kirton 2015). Before Turkey's Presidency, there were five engagement groups within the G20: The Business 20, Civil 20, Labor 20, Think 20, and Youth 20. The establishment of the Women 20 in 2015 further augmented the outreach capacity of the G20. The mandate of the newly established W20, it seemed, was to enhance "women's financial inclusion and education", promote "woman entrepreneurship", and contribute to closing the gender gap in market participation by 25 percent by 2025 (Harris Rimmer 2015b).

A second institutional contribution made during the term of the Turkish Presidency was launching a "private sector-led World SME Forum (WSF) as a global body to support SME's contribution to growth and employment" (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3). The WSF is designed to monitor the future "implementation of recommendations", and to generate "technical assistance and advice for the implementation of standards", as well as to support "the development of entrepreneurial skills and cooperation between private sector, public sector and academia" (Canakci 2015, 5). It is envisioned that the WSF will function as a body facilitating public-private cooperation and serve as "the global voice of SMEs". (Canakci 2015, 5). In the same vein, Turkey also undertook a new project developing a "G20 Framework for Inclusive Business" within the Development Working Group (Canakci 2015, 5). All these initiatives served to underscore Turkey's aim for greater inclusiveness.

Additional concrete developments were made with respect to furthering the already existing G20 mechanisms. The efforts here were to better facilitate macroeconomic cooperation and ensure financial stability. In this regard, the establishment of regulatory bodies ensuring harmonization among member states is crucial, particularly in the context of improving the efficiency of the G20 mechanism (Knight 2015). Thus, an initiative was completed augmenting the Financial Stability Board. Specifically, the international standard on total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) for global systemically important banks (G-SIB) was completed and members agreed on "the first version of higher loss absorbency requirements for global systemically important insurers." (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1). The initiative aimed to assist banks in "[winding] down without damaging the broader economy or making taxpayers foot the bill" (Whitehouse 2015).

Additionally, measures on "the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)" were also completed at the Summit (Ozenc et al. 2015, 2). BEPS refers to taxation strategies adopted by some multinational companies (MNCs), which seek to move their profits to low or no-tax countries or locations which have little or no economic activity, and thereby generate little or

no overall corporate tax for the MNCs (OECD 2016a). The agreed-upon measures aim to help “all interested countries and jurisdictions to work jointly” in taxing multinationals and preventing them from exploiting loopholes in the global system (OECD 2016b).

Building upon measures that emerged from the Australia G20, leaders in Antalya also launched the Global Infrastructure Hub, which was established earlier during the Australian Presidency (Harris Rimmer 2015a). The Australian Presidency had placed priority on infrastructure during its G20 discussions, pointing out its importance for G20 national growth strategies. The Global Infrastructure Initiative, a four-year work program designed to increase the quality of public and private infrastructure investment, was endorsed by the Brisbane Summit (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3). Commencing operations under the Turkish Presidency, the Hub is envisioned to function “as a knowledge-sharing platform and network between governments, the private sector, development banks, and other international organizations” (Ozenc et al. 2015, 1).

Global economy

Particularly notable after the emergence of the Leaders’ Summit in 2008, the G20 assumed the function of “the premier forum for international economic cooperation.” Given this, the success of any presidency is greatly determined by whether the items debated or actions taken have served this overall objective of promoting global economic growth or soundness and enhancement of international financial stability. As with many former presidencies, Turkey’s driving objective was seeking alternative ways to enhance international cooperation and strengthen the already existing relationships for bolstering the world economy.

Turkey assumed the G20 Presidency during a period generally characterized by weak global economic growth. Following a “short-lived” boom succeeding the global financial crisis, the world economy had been growing at only around 3 percent (see Graph 1). While overall growth in 2015 was quite anemic, it was yet even more dire for emerging market economies. Disappointing growth rates in China and Brazil shook confidence, as both countries were leading engines of global growth. In 2015, emerging markets suffered a USD \$750 billion (IIF 2016) outflow. Also, during the summer, the fledgling Chinese stock market suffered a serious decline raising concerns over a possible China-originated economic crisis. Against this turbulent global economic backdrop, Turkey’s G20 Presidency sought to initiate collective actions to counter signs of weak global economic performance. It is not clear whether G20 members did, in fact, develop special mechanisms and take novel actions to stimulate the world economy. However, the Turkish Presidency placed a special focus on investment, and refocused attention on the Brisbane growth strategies.

At the Australia G20 Summit, members made commitments to achieve an additional 2 percent in economic growth over the following 5 years. The G20 members committed to an action plan consisting of over 1,000 new measures (Canakci 2015, 3). Although the idea of promoting additional global growth through collective action was adopted during the Australian Presidency, it was in fact during the Turkish Presidency that member countries undertook the first concrete action steps. To facilitate achievement of these national targets, countries selected 127 key commitments from the 1,000 plus



Graph 1 Global growth rates (% GDP).

Source: IMF (2016). *World Economic Outlook: Too Slow for Too Long*. *World Economic Outlook*, April. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/pdf/tblparta.pdf>. p.168.

commitments (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3). In addition, the Turkish Presidency undertook development of an accountability framework and monitoring mechanism for growth strategies including efforts for organizing “detailed information and schedules” about how these commitments would be implemented (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3). By taking account global developments in the aftermath of the Brisbane Summit, the G20 members reviewed and adjusted their growth strategies. On a voluntary basis, G20 countries also incorporated additional growth measures to ensure more inclusive growth. In addition to monitoring progress, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors also agreed to prepare an accountability report to present at the Leaders’ Summit in Antalya (Canakci 2015, 3).

In the context of boosting the global economy, investment also represented a focus for the Turkish Presidency. Investment was first incorporated in the G20 agenda during the Russian Presidency in 2013 (Canakci 2015, 3). To revive the decelerating global economy, the Turkish Presidency placed special emphasis on investments and inserted this item onto the G20 agenda. This emphasis on investment aimed to enhance investment rates hindered by low confidence levels in a world economy characterized by sluggish and fragile growth (G20 Turkey 2015, 5). Brisbane had already seen an emphasis on the G20 taking steps “to create new structures to support infrastructure investment” (TEPAV and Chatham House 2015, 1). Over Turkey’s Presidency, “specific investment strategies” were also introduced to assist countries dealing with shortcomings in their commitments to growth through increased stimulation of infrastructural investment (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3). Turkey’s Presidency called upon G20 members “to identify investment/infrastructure gaps in their economies and then to design concrete strategies to address these gaps” (Canakci 2015, 3). Each member drafted its investment strategies, which were then circulated to other G20 members for within-group knowledge sharing in the G20. These investment strategies included numerous policies and actions aimed at advancing the investment ecosystem; generating efficient and high-quality infrastructure—including

infrastructure for the public sector; promoting SMEs; and enriching knowledge sharing between member states (Canakci 2015, 3). More than 300 measures aimed to support and complement the Brisbane growth strategies were submitted in response to this call. Within the context of promoting investment, the incorporation of the SMEs into the country-specific investment strategies during Turkey's Presidency was another important outcome (Ozenc et al. 2015, 3).

The G20 from Antalya to Hangzhou and beyond

The Antalya communique reflected the efforts of Turkey's Presidency to steer the G20 toward a forum that addresses developmental matters and inclusiveness in the global economy. It also stressed the importance of the sustainable development goals, climate change, and energy access. The G20 priorities of the Chinese Presidency further emphasized these issues, and underlined innovation-led growth, technology, and connectivity-enhancing infrastructure investment as key subjects (Altug 2015).

Turkey gave special importance to inclusiveness and inclusive growth during its Presidency. China also identified inclusiveness as one of the G20 priorities in its Presidency. China had worked under the banners "inclusive growth", "inclusive finance", and "green finance" as the G20's core agenda. The China Presidency sought to encourage synergy between global growth and global development. China's G20 Presidency signaled a transformational agenda that sought to bring in the developmental needs of the emerging economies. China had successfully gained support from other G20 members in Asia, the BRICS, the developing world, and Europe-likely countries to its G20 priorities (Chin and Dobson 2015, 17). China has certain advantages and experience to promote inclusive growth in different manners. China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative aims to promote infrastructure investment and connectivity over a wide range of Eurasian and European landmass. Together with the foundation of the AIIB and the BRICS Bank provided new financial instruments for China to properly apply its G20 agenda on inclusive growth (Altug 2015).

Despite many efforts, the G20 has had a poor record in increasing the rate of global economic growth. From Brisbane to Antalya, the G20 growth target to boost collective output by 2 percent has not been fulfilled. The Hangzhou G20 Summit in September 2016 was hardly surprising in again seeking to achieve these development and growth targets fixed by the leaders' summit in recent years (Luckhurst 2016). The inability to find clear solutions to persistently low growth overshadowed other aspects of the agenda from Antalya to Hangzhou.

Assessments and shortcomings of the Turkish Presidency and the Antalya Summit

Given the interconnected nature of global challenges, the G20 is expected to develop "concrete, and achievable targets and measurable outcomes" on a global scale (Inan and Asik 2014, 20). This examination of Turkey's Presidency shows that progress was achieved in agenda-setting and processing, institutionalization, and improvement in the global economy. However, these achievements were limited.

The G20 provides an unprecedented opportunity for emerging and middle powers to demonstrate their importance in global governance. These countries “covet this role, as it allows them potentially to “punch above their weight”.” (Cooper and Mo 2011) (Chin and Dobson 2015, 3–4). Thus, these powers are expected to maximize the opportunity. While this is the ever present hope, the Turkish Presidency was unable to utilize the role to demonstrate its full potential. In terms of creating a new agenda, the Turkish Presidency failed, it seems, in providing unique contributions. The ruling impression is that Turkey did not put a decisive stamp on G20 agenda-setting. As discussed above, the emphasis on the Internet and SMEs stands as two instances of unique contributions made during this Summit. The Turkish Presidency, however, will not be remembered as one marked by a distinctive agenda-setting contribution.

The initiation of the W20 and WSF were important contributions but fell short of what Turkey might have achieved. While both the W20 and WSF served Turkey's focus on “inclusivity”, an opportunity for real action was missed in the context of low-income developing countries (LIDC). Despite Turkey's prioritization of the LIDC perspective in the G20 agenda, its efforts did not lead to an institutional output. The absence of the poorest countries and prioritization of “the immediate concerns of the high-income and middle-income countries” (Sachs 2009) appear to be a reoccurring G20 problem, even though the G20 accounts for: 86 percent of global GDP, 80 percent of the world's total exports, 62 percent of the world's entire population, 82 percent of the world's cumulative defense expenditures, and 94 percent of global arms exports (Colakoglu, Hecan, and Sakaoglu 2016, 14). The G20 still suffers issues of non-inclusiveness and selective representation. To more fully address the representation gap in the G20, the Turkish Presidency might have pushed for the launch of a special body or a group that can better convey the LIDC's perspectives on the global economy inside the G20. Such an institutional contribution could have certainly enhanced the G20's emphasis on inclusiveness, and investing real effort in ensuring that “globalization works for everybody” (Martin 2015).

On the other hand, as opposed to their shortcomings in agenda setting and generating novel contributions, it still could be argued that Turkey was relatively successful in terms of processing and deepening the agenda items inherited from the preceding Brisbane Summit. In this regard, the Turkish Presidency could be held up as an example of ensuring continuity in-between annual summits. This is particularly crucial in terms of promoting a legacy of coherent and interconnected agenda-setting and processing within the G20 as, theoretically, the agendas of the preceding summits “bind” their successors and commitments made to designated goals (Chin and Dobson 2015, 4). Such goals include poverty reduction, or reaching a certain volume of global output or international trade. Goals such as these must be sustained through successive summits given that the achievement of these policy commitments span more than one single summit (Chin and Dobson 2015, 4). In this sense, the solid linkage between the Brisbane and Antalya Summits over growth strategies is a good illustration of how continuity needs to be achieved from one summit to another. It has been observed that, if G20 members do not put significant effort in implementing preceding agreements, G20 leaders will see little success (TEPAV and Chatham House 2015, 1). In this regard, the specification and advancement of Brisbane growth strategies during Turkey's Presidency was a positive effort.

To be sure, the contribution of Turkey's Presidency to the Brisbane growth strategies and heightened emphasis on investment were important in stimulating the previous year's disappointing growth rates. However, given that these issues need further work and must be advanced in subsequent presidencies before there can be collective and converged action, the fruits of the initiated strategies are more likely to be reaped in succeeding summits. The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis was a decisive test for the G20 in terms of whether or not it could lead a successful post-crisis management campaign to ensure sound recovery in the global economy. Within this context, Turkey's real contribution to the G20's capacity to "prevent or at least to bring lasting solutions to future regional or global financial crises" (Colakoglu, Hecan, and Sakaoglu 2016, 19) could be questioned. In both the Brisbane and Antalya Summits, commitments were made particularly with respect to global growth strategies. Even though there has been much accomplished, there are criticisms that with a global economy featuring disappointing growth rates, the G20 target to lift their collective GDP by at least 2.1 percent by 2018 is remains elusive. As indicated above, this has been a common problem for the Brisbane, Antalya, and Hangzhou Summits. This adds more doubt to the already existing concerns related to the G20 commitments and their feasibility. Perhaps, the G20 members and hosting countries need to think more about novel approaches to policy implementation as much as developing the ideas themselves.

Originally, Turkey's desire to host the G20 Presidency emerged as a function of its increasingly heightened activism in foreign policy from the early 2000s and the resultant growing interest in global governance mechanisms in which it intended to play greater roles. At the time, this was matched by the country's rising international clout. When Turkey volunteered in 2011, the country was believed to be "the prime example of what then seemed an inexorable global shift in power away from mature economies." (Finkel 2015). In other words, it was the heyday of Turkish foreign policy. It was lauded as a model country for its Middle Eastern counterparts to follow, thanks to its growing economy and progress demonstrated in a democracy characterized by a secular and western-oriented state-mind (Altunişik and Martin 2011). In 2011, Turkey's future hosting seemed likely to capture for it an already rising international prestige in 2015.

However, events developed differently and this in turn negatively affected Turkey's performance as host. By 2015, the country's international clout had dramatically deteriorated due to the unchecked vagaries of the Syrian crisis, growing divergence of perceptions with the United States and Russia over issues in the Middle East, particularly Syria, a decline of political Islamist movements, supported by Turkey, abroad (i.e., those in Egypt and Libya) and ensuing worsening relations with those countries. In addition, there were continuing bottlenecks in the EU admission process, and there was a growing perception that Turkey's state was increasingly authoritarian and harbored graft scandals and was no longer a desirable "model country" to be followed by its Middle Eastern counterparts. Turkey's declining international clout was best illustrated by the mere 109 votes (in 2008 Turkey, as noted above, received 151 votes) it received in the 2014 Security Council Elections and its subsequent failure to qualify for non-permanent membership during the 2-year term of 2015 and 2016 (UN Elections 2014). By 2015, Turkey faced a very different international landscape than it had surveyed in 2011.

By 2015 Turkey was also suffering from deteriorating internal circumstances in 2015. Turkey faced a crisis primarily stemming from increasing political uncertainty. After 13 years of uninterrupted rule, Turkey's AK Party (Justice and Development Party) failed to achieve an absolute majority in the June 2015 parliamentary elections. Although there was the possibility of forming a coalition government with opposition parties, Turkish parties opted for a snap election, which was then held on November 1. Although the AK Party succeeded in obtaining one-party majority rule in the second elections, Turkey experienced significant political uncertainty in the intervening months. Uncertainty increased with the number of terrorism incidents following the collapse of the peace process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and with the growing infiltration of terrorist organizations, like ISIS, from Syria and Iraq.

This negative domestic landscape was worsened by the Paris terrorist attacks, which not only prevented the French President, Francois Hollande, from attending the Summit, but also eclipsed the Summit on the global agenda. This combination of negative and unforeseen circumstances sapped Turkey's power and hindered it from leading a focused Presidency. Within Turkey, the G20 was regarded as the type of international event that should be followed up by and maintained with bureaucratic preparation and monitoring. Even the public failed to be interested in the Antalya Summit until after the November 1 parliamentary elections. When compared with the performances of preceding presidencies of similar characteristics to Turkey, Turkey's success seemed to lag. Turkey's case illustrates that the success of emerging or middle powers in leading international gatherings like the G20 depends on their level of international clout and domestic stability.

Conclusion

Given the recent literature on the G20, it is difficult to draw conclusions over the success of the various summits. Nonetheless, making relative assessments is desirable. In this article, we have not compared Turkey's Presidency with other comparable cases like the Presidencies of Korea, Canada, Mexico, and Australia. However, focusing on the changing foreign policy context of Turkey, itself, has provided us with sufficient intuition to make a comparative assessment. Within the difficult domestic context, it is at least arguable that the G20 Turkish Summit was a missed chance for Turkey. Turkey could have better demonstrated its significance for global governance and made novel contributions without the above-mentioned negative domestic backdrop. However, on the positive side, Turkey's G20 Presidency was still characterized by concrete developments. Turkey was able to set certain agenda items, advance the institutionalization of the G20, and undertake some important steps for sound global economic growth.

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