

“On the Table or at the Table?” G20 and its Cooperation with Africa

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This article contains an analysis of the cooperation with African governments during the German presidency of the G20 in 2017. The author argues that the G20's exclusive approach to global rule-making for the world economy contradicts the G20's aim to support domestic economic development in Africa. The empirical analysis provides a systematic assessment of G20 policies in 2017, in particular the Compact with Africa (CWA). An assessment of the procedural outcomes, such as representation of African governments and institutions, is also given in the article. The empirical analysis is based on insights from the Think 20 process, an official engagement process of the G20. The article concludes that it was innovative to prioritize cooperation with African governments on the G20 agenda and to recognize the importance of African ownership. Although policy implementation of this initiative began right after the G20 Summit in July 2017, especially of the CWA, no deeper engagement of African actors in the G20 process was achieved.

“Africa needs to sit at the table and not be a subject on the table in G20”

Gamal Ibrahim, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa¹

Introduction

The G20 is an exclusive club of major economies, which sets the agenda and rules for the global economy.² Including the most significant economies implies that the majority of countries in the world are excluded. Given the small share of African economies in the world economy, the African continent has been playing a limited role in the G20 (Leininger et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2009). South Africa is the only participating G20 member country from Africa. From a realist point of view, including only the largest African economy mirrors well the economic power distribution of the current global order (Moss, 2018). However, from a developmental and global justice perspective, the composition and policies of the G20 needs to change because

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¹Statement during the Managing Global Governance conference, held at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) from 19 to 22 November 2018.

²The G20 emerged from the global financial crisis 2008/2009. Since then, it has broadened its mandate of setting norms for regulating the global financial system to cover social issues. For further information see the introduction to this special issue.

they perpetuate an unequal and unjust global order (Pogge, 2003; Bourguignon, 2016, p. 15; Slaughter, 2017). While G20 policies and statements have to date been focusing on assisting and supporting domestic economic and social change in African countries, unintended but direct effects of global G20 policies on Africa, for example financial regulations or climate change remained mostly unaddressed.

I argue that the G20's role as a global agenda and rule-setter (Cooper and Takur, 2013) contradicts its policies to support domestic economic and social development in Africa. To date, the G20 has not expended much effort to include African voices and representation although there is high interdependence between the prospects for economic development on the African continent and global rule-making. Africa's limited integration in the world economy has its root causes in uneven global norms and rules (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). For instance, protectionism in trade relations continues to put products from African markets at a disadvantage and hinders their further integration into the world economy (Narlikar, 2017). Hence, the G20 efforts to support economic and social development in Africa are likely to be undermined because of a lack of fair norm-setting at the global level. If the G20 wants to support African economies in a sustainable way, they need to apply a two-track strategy. The strategy would reinforce the interplay between development of domestic markets and fair global rule-making at the same time. Some authors argue that African participation in the world economy is more likely if African economies are represented in global settings, such as the G20, and assist in the shaping of global rules (Moss, 2018).

This article includes an analysis of the outcomes of the German G20 presidency's efforts to broaden and strengthen cooperation in 2017 with Africa. In the light of the G20's unbalanced approach of supporting economic and social development in Africa while pursuing an unbalanced multilateralism, two sets of research questions guide this analysis. First, what are the main outcomes of the German G20 Summit process with regard to cooperation with Africa? Are initiatives and policies for G20 cooperation with Africa marked by continuity or change? Since neither the G20 has its own implementing agency nor its member states have proper institutions for implementing G20 policies multilateral organizations take over this task. Have the multilateral institutions been carrying out these policies? Second, did the Africa-related initiatives of the German G20 presidency foster more African representation during the G20 process³ and beyond the Summit of July 2017?

The analysis here draws on the author's insights from the "Think 20" (T20) process - an official engagement process of the G20.⁴ Experts from G20 countries met frequently in different task forces and exchanged views on the implications of the findings of empirical research. The research covered such issues as international tax cooperation, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and global trade. In particular, the launch of the T20 Africa Standing Group, a network that brings together more than 30 think tanks from Africa and G20 countries, allowed for a deep exchange on the assessment of G20 cooperation with Africa. Invaluable conversations, writing of policy briefs and holding joint workshops with partners from the T20 network, and government officials involved in the G20 process substantially enriched the analysis.

³G20 process is understood in a broad sense in this article, including the outreach processes.

⁴See for further information: <http://www.t20germany.org/> and <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/t20africa-standinggroup/>

In the remainder of this article, I outline the theoretical and conceptual premises for assessing the policy and procedural outcome of the German G20 presidency. The following analysis of the outcomes has two parts. The first part contains a short history of G20 cooperation with Africa, which frames the assessment of the policy outcomes, in particular the CWA. The second part of the assessment of the outcomes of the G20 presidency addresses procedural issues: such as the representation of African institutions and voices in the G20 process. The article concludes with a summary of its main findings and implications for future G20 presidencies—the Argentinean presidency (2017/2018); and then followed with the Japanese presidency (2018/2019).

Conceptual Premises: Assessing Policy and Procedural Outcomes of the German G20 Presidency

Assessments of club governance range from quantitative accounts of G20 declarations and policy documents for accountability purposes (Shaw and Vassallo 2011; Kirton et al. 2016) to qualitative analyses of specific policy sectors (e.g. Edenhofer et al. 2017); and to the actors' and power constellations of G20 and their implications for the global order (e.g. Narlikar 2010). The following analysis is largely qualitative: it combines an assessment of policy contents and the procedural dimension of the German G20 presidency and its focus on cooperation with Africa.

Criteria for assessing G20 cooperation with Africa during the German presidency draw on the assumption that economic and social development in Africa requires not only adequate and consistent G20 policies but also representation of African decision-makers in the global agenda and global rule-setting. Accordingly, the German G20 presidency must be assessed based on its policy and procedural outcomes. Figure 1, below, gives an overview of the criteria that were applied in the subsequent analysis. The three selected criteria were borrowed from public policy literature (see for an overview Peters and Zittoun 2016).

Policy outcomes refer to the content of decisions that were taken by G20 members during the process leading up to the 2017 G20 Summit in Hamburg. The first criterion refers to agenda-setting, which is the process of bringing (issues) to the agenda or deemphasizing issues that have been on the agenda before (Tallberg 2003, p. 5). In the context of network governance, such as the G20, bringing new issues to the agenda requires actions of different players including from states, civil society, international organizations, and business (Eccleston et al. 2013). Each G20 presidency has leeway to set its priorities and shape the agenda through its own narrative, which differs from previous G20 presidencies. However, too much emphasis on new issues undermines sustainability of previous commitments of the G20. G20 work streams and agendas continuity is important to ensure commitment and successful implementation. For instance, efforts related to tax transparency are important for mitigating illicit financial flows. Setting and implementing norms and standards for tax transparency does not take place between two summits but needs to continue to be emphasized on the agenda to be achieved. In addition, agenda setting in the G20 is not only a multi-actor process, but it is also a multi-layer process because the global




Figure 1. Criteria for assessing outcomes of G20 cooperation with Africa.

Source: Author description and compilation.

G20 agenda competes with and complements initiatives of individual member states.

The second criterion refers to the implementation of G20 decisions. Although it is still too early to assess the implementation of the initiatives to cooperate with Africa, there are several indications in the decisions of the 2017 G20 Hamburg Summit that enable a preliminary assessment of the potential for implementation and sustainability. Being an informal and exclusive institution, the G20 has no implementing agencies for formal implementation of policy decisions (Cooper and Pouliot 2015). If decisions are to be successfully implemented, while at the same time not undermine existing global institutions, it is important to define the actors and institutions that are responsible for policy implementation at the outset of G20 decisions (Eccleston *et al.* 2013, p. 213). G20 decisions are either implemented by international institutions, the member states themselves, or a combination of both. If there is no reference made to the institutionalization of the decision through linking up to ongoing global processes in multilateral institutions or to individual national policy agendas, the decision will hardly be implemented. However, not only institutions and commitments should be ensured, but also a certain level of alignment with the current policy debates in a specific field. If suggested policies are untied from ongoing policy contents, they are not likely to be taken up and implemented by G20 actors.

Procedural outcomes refer to the constellation of actors involved in decision-making in the G20. Being an “exclusive club”, G20 decision-making focuses on its participating countries. In recent years, the finance and Sherpa track opened up to groups, which inform their policy-making. The different engagement groups, the T20, Business 20 (B20), or Women 20 (W20) are all examples of those allied groups. At the same time, decision-making is kept exclusive as no new actors are allowed at the G20’s negotiation table. Participating in policy-making through providing advice and exchange with G20 presidencies and participating states is important for formulating adequate policies that deal with relevant interests and the needs of non-participating actors. The merits of inviting new actors to the table of “clubs” and broadening participation to facilitate a consensus on global issues has been openly debated (Leininger 2009). With regard to G20

cooperation with Africa, it is assumed that a formalized representation of African interests is needed if African economies shall avoid being left behind.

The *structural context* of global policy-making shapes agenda setting and decision-making. Political crises and tensions, such as the Syrian War, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influence relationships between countries and their world leaders who attend the G20 Summit. This high level of personalization of G20 summits makes agenda setting and decision-making very vulnerable to their global structural context. Accordingly, global dynamics must be considered in the analysis of the outcomes of the G20 cooperation with Africa.

Policy and Procedural Outcomes of the German G20 Presidency on Cooperation with Africa

The G20 was confronted with a looming *political crisis* in 2017, which was triggered by the election of a United States president skeptical of freer trade and multilateral cooperation, and a wave of nationalistic and populist movements in many societies and the politics in G20 countries (Hurrell 2018, pp. 94–97). Faced with such challenges, the German presidency, (December 2016 to November 2017) had to rethink its approach to pursuing an ambitious and broad agenda for the G20. For more information on other policy issues on the G20 agenda see other articles of this special issue. In the altered structural context of the German presidency, cooperation with Africa appeared to be a “low hanging fruit” that could be placed on the G20 agenda. Africa-related policies did not directly address any of the difficult global dynamics that had appeared in 2017. It was easy to agree that the G20 made up of the world’s major economies and had a responsibility to support economic development. As the German G20 presidency continued to promote the need to better integrate African economies in the world economy through domestic instead of global reforms, setting cooperation with Africa on the agenda was uncontested in 2017. However, cooperation with Africa got an enhanced status because it was for the first time tackled in the finance track of the G20.

Policy Outcomes: Innovation on the Agenda, Business as Usual in Implementation

Since its elevation to the summit level in 2008, the G20 has focused in a major way on managing the fallout from the global financial crisis and creating a more effective regulatory environment. Interest in cooperation with Africa increased throughout the years, but it remained limited when compared with its key policy areas. Africa-related issues, in particular on pledging official development assistance (ODA), were first mentioned in the documents of the 2010 G20 London Summit (Hallink 2016, p. 10). Since then, G20 policies have been focusing on development in Africa in general and on financing multilateral financial institutions involved with the continent, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) (Grant-Makokera 2016; Hallink 2016, p. Appendix F; Shaw and Vassallo 2011). Beyond Africa-specific initiatives, Africa has been—as other world regions—an addressee of G20 policy in different issue areas, such as development, climate, health, or education (Hallink 2017).

In G20 documents and policies, cooperation with Africa has been framed as a relationship between a “donor” or “supporter” (G20) and a “recipient” receiving assistance. Portrayed as a passive actor, Africa has been the “subject on the table”, not at the table (Bradlow 2014). The declaration of the 2009 G20 London Summit illustrates the division between the G20 and the African countries: “[we reaffirm our historic commitment] to achieving our respective ODA pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and the Gleneagles commitments, especially to sub-Saharan Africa” (G20 2009, p. 25).

Only the Chinese G20 presidency in 2016 put cooperation with Africa more prominently on its agenda (Leininger *et al.* 2017). China did so because it fit its national geostrategic interests. It complemented China’s “One Belt, One Road” development strategy, which aims at boosting Eurasian trade. Its G20 agenda was built on the premise that “[...] As the biggest developing country, China believes that the G20 should pay more attention to the issue of development and devote more efforts in this regard” (Yi 2016). The Chinese presidency lived up to its promise. It set support for industrialization in Africa and least developed countries (LDCs) one of the priorities for its presidency. In the summit communiqué G20 countries committed to support industrialization in Africa and LDCs. To further that commitment, China launched the G20 Initiative on “Supporting Industrialization in Africa and LDCs” (G20, 2016a). Although the initial effort was set for making cooperation with Africa a more prominent issue on the G20 agenda, the Hangzhou Summit remained a “talk shop” on Africa-related issues (Hallink 2016, p. 15). The G20 initiative to support industrialization has to date failed to yield any tangible results. This lack of implementation is due to China’s priority on building hubs and spokes for cooperation with the continent, which allow the Asian country to pursue its national interests (Grimm 2015).

At the beginning of the German presidency in December 2016, Germany made clear it wished to boost cooperation with African partners (G20 2016b, p. 9). Although Germany had already announced during the China Hangzhou summit that it would hold a conference on Africa in June 2017 to follow up on the Chinese presidency’s initiative, additional dynamics pushed Germany to stress cooperation with Africa on the G20 agenda (Bertelsmann-Scott and Sidiropoulos 2016). The so-called migration crisis in Europe from North Africa has made the German government more sensitive to shocks related to Africa (Hallink 2016, p. 8). The German government assumed that more investments in Africa “[...] would also contribute to the fight against the root causes of flight and displacement” (G20 2016b, p. 10).

As a consequence, the strong emphasis on cooperation with Africa was more triggered by German national interests than the need to guarantee continuity on the G20 agenda following the Hangzhou Summit. Various German ministries re-enforced their efforts to cooperate with Africa and setup new strategies. In particular, the Marshall Plan with Africa of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development presented a broad strategy based on three thematic pillars (in short, economy, peace, and governance) (BMZ 2017). At the same time, the Federal Ministry of Finance, lead of the G20 process in the German government, developed the CwA for the G20. Both initiatives build on the idea of strengthening private investments. Throughout 2017, the German government made efforts to bring both initiatives (Marshall Plan and CwA) together and agreed by July 2017

that pursuing reform partnerships with African governments would be the common denominator of both policies.

The main policy outcome of the German G20 presidency is the CwA, which was adopted at the G20 finance ministers and central bankers meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany in March 2017 (G20, 2017). The CwA is framed as a partnership between self-selecting African countries and the G20 with the inclusion of key multilateral and bilateral partners. Despite of the strong emphasis on private investments the private sector has not been included in the official CwA process. By emphasizing partnerships with Africa, the German government called for ownership of the initiative by African countries. Engaging in a partnership to attract more private infrastructure investment is voluntary and up to each African government. However, indirect financial conditionalities are in place, for instance, a sound macroeconomic framework is a condition to be a CwA member country. The CwA approach constitutes a shift from public funding to private investments. Private Public Partnerships build the basis for infrastructure development, especially roads. No significant additional resources were allocated to foster private investment through the compact in 2017. In this approach, governments rather play the role of compensators and regulators when private investments are at risk (for instance, compensation for losses because of “event majeure” as hurricanes or international arbitration mechanisms to settle disputes). Thus, private business is required to play a crucial role for success in implementing the compact.

Assessments of the Compact’s rationale vary. Some scholars argue that it presents an opportunity to increase private investment, especially in infrastructure (Bhattacharya and Coulibaly 2017). Missing infrastructure has been often identified as a major obstacle for economic development in Africa. Others argue that the Compact is business as usual as it reflects the Washington Consensus (Kappel *et al.* 2017). It indirectly might leave low-income countries behind, which are the countries challenged by the largest infrastructure gaps on the African continent (Paulo, 2017). Also, the social and political environment still needs to be considered more prominently: private investment generates jobs and improves development only if education and vocational training is provided (Thiele *et al.* 2018).

Overall, agenda setting of the German G20 presidency with regard to cooperation with Africa marks continuity with the Chinese Hangzhou Summit rather than a policy change. Africa has remained an important issue on the G20’s agenda. However, the German presidency prioritized cooperation with Africa by launching an Africa-related initiative. The CWA was the first Africa-related policy of the G20 that received a single-standing document at a G20 Summit. An outline of the initiative was given, which included related policy goals and an implementation structure. With regard to policy content, the German government narrowed the earlier Chinese Summit focus on industrialization to an investment-oriented policy.

Implementation of the CWA

Implementation of the CwA was a concern for the German presidency after it introduced the initiative to the G20 in early 2017. It worked closely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank (AfDB) (Bank *et al.* 2017) to introduce the concept of the compact to the G20 finance ministers and central bankers in Baden-Baden in

March 2017. Implementation was well prepared through the establishment of an informal governance structure, which accompanies the compact as it unfolds. For that purpose, the Africa Advisory Group (AAG), an informal body comprising a sub-set of G20 member countries, the African compact countries, the World Bank, the AfDB, the IMF and other stakeholders, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was created. Monitoring instruments, including, among others, an annual monitoring report and specific events to foster private investments, complement the work of the advisory group. The first assessment report was presented in April 2018 and the next CwA investors meeting is scheduled to take place in Indonesia during the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF in October 2018 (Africa 2018a, 2018b). In addition, the German government invited an African think tank, the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), to follow the process and provide research and knowledge as well as networks of experts to enable evidence-based policy-making.⁵ However, institutional structures alone cannot guarantee the implementation of the compact.

In order to implement the CwA⁶ commitments by African states, assistance from G20 countries and private business are needed. At the time of writing, 11 African economies are participating in the compact (Benin, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia).⁷ According to the first CwA monitoring report, they are making good progress developing the macro-financial and business framework needed to attract private investment. However, G20 states were not very proactive in promoting private investments and, thus, little progress on private sector engagement has been made. Most partnerships mainly continue already existing programs and policies to build infrastructure in their respective countries. However, if private investments are to increase, additional resources must be mobilized, especially from the private sector. In addition, countries that perform the best economically might not be stable on the long run – take, for instance, the CwA partners Egypt or Rwanda. Closed political regimes are more likely to face civil war when powerholders continuously disregard societal conflict. The plan's intention to identify and work with "African reform champions" is, thus, likely to be difficult to actualize.

The largest challenge for sustained G20 cooperation with Africa and the implementation of the CwA is the high overlap of G20 states to pursue new cooperative initiatives with Africa. In that regard, G20 countries generally follow two parallel tracks: they have their own bilateral initiatives and only in some cases use the G20 to launch new or different policy initiatives. Those bilateral and G20 initiatives are not always complementary, sustained nor followed up in the medium to long-term. For instance, during the German G20 presidency, Germany proposed a G20 CwA while the European Union in parallel launched the EU External Investment Plan during the African Union-European summit, which took place on November 29-30, 2017. Both initiatives are aimed at strengthening the investment environment in African countries and creating incentives for (foreign)

⁵For further information on the work of ACET see <http://acetforafrica.org/> (accessed on May 18, 2018)

⁶In this paragraph, I refer to the CwA as it stands. Additional policies that would be needed to foster structural economic transformation in Africa are not addressed here.

⁷At the time of writing two more African countries negotiated participation in the CwA.

investment in infrastructure and other areas and remain largely disconnected from other international partners' investments in infrastructure and other areas. In 2016, the Chinese G20 Presidency launched a new but poorly followed-up on G20 initiative on industrialization for LDCs, while the Chinese One Belt One Road Initiative – with substantial financial resources linked to it – has remained a bilateral endeavor. Whether and how the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which is being promoted by India, Japan, and African countries, will feature during the Japanese G20 presidency remains unclear as well.

A low number of commitments to the CwA is one result of this overlap. At the time of writing, only Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the USA explicitly supported the CwA (Keil 2017). Governments from the Global South did not reinforce the CwA. For instance, the BRICS⁸ issues a complementary summit declaration at each G20 Summit (Leininger et al. 2017). Their declaration at the 2017 summit did not endorse or even refer to the Compact.

Alignment of the CwA and G20 policies with African priorities and already existing policies is important for reinforcing global and regional agendas (Bhattacharya and Coulibaly 2017). Although the initial statements of the German G20 presidency had suggested that the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development would play an important role in cooperation with Africa, it has not been given a strong role in the CwA. In contrast, financial gains seem to outweigh the need to build sustainable infrastructure in the CwA.

Procedural Outcomes: Developmental Approach without Structural Changes of Africa's Global Role

In the G20, Africa-related issues were mostly narrowed down to development in Africa, while broader global issues, such as fair trade standards and financial stability were hardly addressed in the relationship between the G20 and Africa. The establishment of the Development Working Group (DWG) during the Republic of Korea (Korea) presidency of the G20 in 2010 led to the creation of a forum to discuss development-related issues in the Sherpa track. As the only African G20 member, South Africa's co-chairmanship of the working group has ensured that African issues are tackled there. Furthermore, a special effort was made during the Korean presidency to bring more African perspectives to the table. Two pan-African organizations accepted the invitation to become observers at the G20 meetings – the AU and the Heads of States and Government Coordination Committee of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), whose rotating chairs attend every year. As the chairs of the AU and the NEPAD Committee rotate regularly there is only limited continuity in the representation (Grant Makokera 2014; Leininger et al. 2017). This limitation is compounded by the rare if any participation of African officials in the G20 preparatory meetings.

Germany's goal was to support development *in Africa* and not Africa's voice in the world and G20 structures even though a more active and effective role of African governments in global fora that regulate the world economy would help to meet the G20's objectives to foster African economies'

⁸An association of five major national economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

integration into the world market (Moss 2018). Although dealing with Africa-related issues in the finance track and not the Sherpa track of the G20 was a first, no African government was directly involved in formulating the CwA (Leininger et al. 2017). Instead, African voices were only represented at conference on Africa hosted by Chancellor Merkel in July 2017.⁹ The main purpose of this conference was to initiate the reform partnerships. While the conference on Africa ensured a systematic exchange between government officials, civil society, business, and think tanks on development in Africa, it took place in an isolated discourse from the official G20 preparation process. No structural changes with regard to better African representation were made.

At the same time, the AU initialized a reform of Africa's external relationships. The result of this process, the "Kagame Report" (Kagame 2017), once again called for Africa's global representation, indicating that it is one of four key responsibilities for the African Union. Such an approach would give African governments the possibility to shape global rules, also in the G20. However, this African agenda was not picked-up by the German G20 presidency.

Conclusions

In this article, the policy (agenda setting and implementation) and procedural (participation) outcomes of the German G20 presidency in 2017 were analyzed (figure 1). The article started with the assumption that the G20 has been pursuing an unbalanced approach in supporting economic and social development in Africa, excluding the majority of African economies in global rule-making. Overall, the analysis shows that although the attention paid to Africa-related issues grew in 2017 the lack of willingness to provide better and deeper African representation in global governance continued. The German G20 presidency was successful in placing a new initiative, the CwA, on the agenda of the G20. It built on work of the previous Chinese presidency and established an implementation strategy and structure for the CwA. However, commitments of individual G20 countries to implement the CwA are low because of their own initiatives to cooperate with Africa, such as the Belt and Road Initiative of China and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, supported by India and Japan. Although those initiatives focus on building cross-border infrastructure, they may be undermined if they fail to provide coordination (Paulo 2017).

No advancement has been made in enhancing representation of African interests in global governance and economic rule-making. African governments continue to be excluded from the preparation processes of the G20 summits despite their participation as observers during those events. If at all, they have called for Africa-related policies, such as the CwA or for the Development Working Group of the Sherpa track of the G20. Greater integration of African economies in the global economy is unlikely if Africa remains "on the table" of the G20 instead of sitting at the table for global agenda-setting and rule-making.

⁹Five developing countries participated in the Hangzhou Summit, of which three of them are African: Chad; Egypt; and Senegal; see <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0804/c90883-9095022.html> (accessed on 12 May, 2018).

In a world facing widening differences of rich and poor, and growing threats of terrorism and global pandemics, not to mention the challenges of political stability and accountability, the time has never been more urgent to facilitate an inclusive global discourse on those challenges. There is no doubt that Africa needs to be an active part of the processes to set global standards and involving policy coordination. Africa-G20 cooperation is currently limited to a few initiatives and an observer status for the AU and NEPAD. This level of engagement is insufficient in the light of the global challenges and strong interdependencies between Africa and G20 countries.

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